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# AirLand Operations, Multiagency Indirect Operations, and The CLOSE, DEEP, and REAR ARENAS: Are They Related?

A Monograph
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## ABSTRACT

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by Major James P. Realini, Special Forces, 37 pages

This monograph examines the dimensions of time and space for military operations and the process for synchronization. The specific military operations addressed are: linear warfighting as described in FM 100-5, "Operations," May 1986; Counterinsurgency as described in FM 100-20/AFPam 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," January 1990; and nonlinear warfighting as described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B (Draft), "AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," 26 March 1991. This study is motivated by the challenges of synchronizing different types of operations at the operational level. The study seeks to determine if a relationship exists between the different operations in the process of arranging activities over time in space.

The study begins with an analysis of current AirLand Battle doctrine as typical, modern linear warfare. The arenas of operations in current doctrine, Close, Deep, and Rear, are determined to be compressed in time at specific points of maximum combat power concentration. This analysis of purpose over time in space provides the basis for comparison with Counterinsurgency (COIN) and nonlinear warfighting. The doctrine for COIN describes dimensions for operations that are inverted from warfighting with time relatively long and minimum combat power concentrated over a wide area. The emerging doctrine for nonlinear warfighting is also compressed in time at specific points of maximum combat power concentration. The difference between linear and nonlinear warfighting doctrines occurs in the dimension of space. Linear operations are layered while nonlinear operations are nested in a "shaping zone."

The study concludes that the doctrine for each type of operation reveals a four-part synchronization process consisting of selecting the decisive area, preparing the decisive area, isolating and separating forces in the decisive area, and sustaining the effort.

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## INTRODUCTION

> It is often helpful to think of the four coordinates of an event as specifying its position in a four-dimensional space called space-time. It is impossible to imagine a four-dimensional space. I personally find it hard enough to visualize three-dimensional space! However, it is easy to draw diagrams of two-dimensional spaces, such as the surface of the earth. Stephen W. Hawking[1]

The U. S. Army uses the dimensions of time and space to describe its operations. The Army Warfighting doctrine in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states that "mastery of time-space relationships" is required to fight in accordance with the tenet of synchronization.[2] The complexity of operations at the operational level of war *demands* the mastering of time-space relationships by the operational artist.

The current U. S. Army warfighting doctrine declares that combat occurs in three distinct arenas of close, deep, and rear operations.[3] These three arenas for operations define the dimensions of the battlefield that require synchronization. They each contain their own time-space relationships and they are interrelated with each other in time and space. Emerging doctrine from the preparation of the 1992 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, incorporates two additional concepts within military operations: nonlinear warfare and Military Operations Short of War[4]. With these additions, are the dimensions of the battlefield previously described by the close, deep, and rear arenas relevant or will a new description evolve?

The following premises limit the scope of this study. The premises are partly necessary if this study is to discuss emerging and therefore potentially changing doctrine. The current U. S. Army AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1986 FM 100-5 describes linear combat operations with only a brief mention of nonlinear warfare and its effect on operations.[5] The concept for future AirLand

Operations describes an operations cycle for nonlinear warfare. This concept will become a part of the 1992 version of FM 100-5. The last part of this study contains a description of the essential differences between linear and nonlinear warfare.

The final premises for this study are the definitions for the terms' time, space, and purpose. The definitions used in this study are as follows:

Time: Period of duration when events or activities exist.
Space: Physical dimensions of length, width, height encompassing air, ground, water, and electromagnetic environments in which events or activities exist.
Purpose: Events or activities performed to accomplish tasks or missions.

With these premises in mind, this study will first examine the current doctrine for the close, deep, and rear arenas to determine how they describe the dimensions of operations. Next, current doctrine will be compared to the existing doctrine for Operations Short of War. The doctrine for multiagency indirect operations in counterinsurgency described in FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict is the focus for this studies examination of Operations Short of War. The selection of counterinsurgency for the analysis of multiagency indirect operations attempts to provide the most representative look at Military Operations Short of War within the limits for this study. The selection provides a look at Operations Short of War involving both conflict and non-conflict environments. Finally, the arenas of close, deep, and rear will be compared to emerging doctrine for a nonlinear warfare operations cycle as described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, AirLand Operations: Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army. The comparisons will attempt to determine what relationship exists between the dimensions for linear, nonlinear, and multiagency indirect operations. The study's center of interest in each comparison will be at the operational level of war

In order for the comparisons to be made, the dimensions of linear, nonlinear, and multiagency indirect operations will be evaluated by a three-part criteria. The criteria are derived from the foundations for the AirLand Battle tenet of synchronization. Accordingly, the criteria evaluate the activities in each operational dimension in terms of purpose over time in space.

Specifically, the criteria will measure the dimensions of time and space by answering the following questions. What is the focus for activities in the dimension? In other words, what provides the unity of effort in space over time? Evaluation of the dimension of time will investigate what is the period of duration required for the activities? is it a relatively short period, a lengthy period, or is the period of duration inconsequential to activities? Lastly, the evaluation of the spatial dimension will inquire into the arrangement of activities in space? How do the activities occupy, move or relate in space? The conclusions drawn from answering these questions will illustrate implications for the training of practitioners of operational art.

## PART ONE: The Close, Deep, and Rear Arenas in FM 100-5 (1986)

> Incredible though it sounds, it is a fact that armies have been divided and separated countless times, without the commander having any clear reason for it, simply because he vaguely felt that this was the way things ought to be. Carl von Clausewitz[6]

Close, deep, and rear operations comprise three arenas that define the battlefield at all echelons of warfighting in AirLand Battle doctrine. At the operational echelon, these three arenas can resemble Clausewitz's portrayal of a divided army if the commander synchronizing them only has a vague concept of what he is trying to do. FM 100-5, Operations, provides a clear concept for operational commanders to design campaigns or major operations with the three arenas.

The tenet of synchronization governs the description of each arena. Commanders achieve decisive success by synchronizing the activities of each arena with each other to bring maximum combat power at the decisive point.[7] This decisive point is the enemy's center of gravity determined by the commander.[8] A description of this process from determining the center of gravity to constructing the arenas for operations will illustrate the dimensions of time and space in warfighting operations.

Determining the center of gravity for the enemy is one of the first[9] critical tasks for the commander. The operational commander makes this critical determination in order to concentrate all operations on *destroying* sources of enemy strength or *unbalancing* the enemy force "...producing a cascading deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness."[10] FM 100-5 provides three key elements for understanding the center of gravity of concept. The doctrine portrays the center of gravity as an "organism," a "hub," and something that moves or shifts.

FM 100-5 describes the center of gravity as a complex organism whose effectiveness deponds not only "...on the performance of each of its component parts, but also on the smoothness with which these components interact and the reliability with which they implement the will of the commander."[11] The explanation indicates that destruction or disruption of the command and control system will cause the organism to act disjointed or uncoordinated. This combined with the $C^2$ system's attempt to fight for its own survival while trying to regain control of its forces, synergistically leads to the ultimate disintegration of the enemy force.

The image of the center of gravity viewed as a "hub" comes directly from Clausewitz.[12] It is a point where all combat power focuses to achieve decisive success. By concentrating to destroy this pivot point, the enemy will careen off-

balance like a flywheel broken free of its mounts. Alternatively, the destruction of the flywheel itself will cause the mechanism to cease functioning. While these images refer to attacking some physical thing, the doctrine declares that psychological or moral objects can also qualify as centers of gravity.[13]

The key point when determining a center of gravity is identifying something specific against which you can apply combat power. Identifying only the mass of the enemy force is adequate if your only intent is to conduct attrition warfare. Simply identifying the enemy force, an army or a large unit is not sufficient or practical at the operational level because of the size of the forces involved. Massive resources are required at the operational level to conduct attrition warfare that eventually leads to national exhaustion when decisive results do not occur.[14] Inexhaustible resources are not practically available to the U. S. operational commander.

AirLand Battle doctrine ideally embodies the concept of the indirect approach to attack systematically towards the center of gravity.[15] The operational commander phases his campaign to establish conditions for successive battles at points of vulnerability for the center of gravity. The commander must identify what or where the vulnerability of the organism or hub is. This translates the center of gravity into objectives for the sequential application of combat power.[16]

The identification of a center of gravity is important, but it is not the only part of the commander's evaluation of an enemy. Through the successful completion of campaigns or major operations, the commander must also devise ways to validate continually the assessment of the center of gravity. The center of gravity may shift or move when the enemy reacts in a campaign or major operation. Also, cunning enemy commanders may have tried to conceal their "true" center of gravity from the beginning. In any case, the commander must

never be complacent with his own wisdom in discerning a center of gravity. He must continually evaluate the current validity of the enemy center of gravity.[17]

Objectives for the application of combat power are derived from the commander's assessment of the center of gravity. These objectives seek to concentrate on vulnerabilities in the enemy's protection of his center of gravity. It is at this point that the commander's "vision" for the campaign begins to conform to the dimensions of the battlefield. The commander now selects a course of action for distributing forces and combat power to each of the arenas for operations.

Close operations "bear the ultimate burden of victory or defeat."[18] At the operational level close operations comprise the current activities of *committed* combat forces with their immediate combat support and combat service support elements. It is in this arena that the commander applies maximum combat power against a vulnerability for the enemy's center of gravity.

Winning the battle in the close arena is the focus for AirLand Battle doctrine at the operational level. The operational commander phases consecutive close battle arenas that exploit enemy vulnerabilities and set the conditions for the next close battle. This series of close battles achieves decisive results by unbalancing or destroying the enemy center of gravity causing disintegration of combat power and the loss of will to resist. The designation of the close arena also defines where and when the deep and rear arenas will exist.

Typical Activities Comprising Close Operations[19]

- Maneuver (including deep maneuver)
- Close Combat (including close air support)
- Indirect Fire Support (including counterfire)
- Combat Support/Combat Service Support of *COMMITTED* units
- Command and control

Figure One.

One illustration of this concept is the Breakout by the Eighth (US) Army from the Pusan Perimeter in September, 1950. The enemy forces surrounding Pusan comprised 90% of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). This Army is typically cited as the center of gravity. The breakout aimed at a vulnerability of the NKPA. The NKPA had reached its "culminating point" and was unable to continue offensive actions in the south.[20] Because of the threat posed by the X(US) Corps (Inchon landing forces), the NKPA disintegrated when the withdrawal in the south combined with an unsuccessful delay in the north became a general route for the NKPA.

Having examined the concept for the close arena the following observations appear for the dimensions of close operations. The focus for "close" activities in both time and space are the application of maximum combat power against a vulnerability for the enemy center of gravity. In time, the duration of the close arena is finite with a specific start and finish. The character of time in close operations is rapid action and speed. Because of this, time tends to be "compressed" in close operations and waiting often translates into lost opportunities. In space, activities for the close arena concentrate the mass of combat power at specific points. The activities of close operations occupy each of the physical mediums of height, width, and depth and deny or eject enemy forces from friendly controlled space.

The next arena for examination is deep operations. At the operational level, deep operations isolate current battles (close operations) and influence the conditions for subsequent battles.[21] Deep operations <u>do not produce</u> decisive success exclusive of close and rear operations. The operational commander apportions forces and combat power to the deep arena against those enemy threats which directly threaten the success of friendly close or projected operations.

Deep operations assist the operational commander's exploitation of vulnerabilities in the enemy center of gravity. This occurs by attacking $C^2$ systems, paralyzing combat support and combat service support systems, and interdicting forces that can effect projected close battles. Deep operations are economy of force operations with the bulk of combat power being applied to close operations. Accordingly, the careful design of deep operations commits sufficient combat power to achieve decisive impact.

Typical Activities Comprising Deep Operations[22]

- Deception
- Deep Surveillance and target acquisition
- Interdiction: specifically or in combinations
  SOF/Ground Maneuver/USAF/Long Range Artillery
- Command, control, and communications countermeasures
- Command and control

Figure Two.

Again using the historical example of Korea, the doctrine for deep operations appears in the Inchon landings of September, 1950. The landings aimed at a vulnerability of the NKPA, the absence of forces securing their right, rear flank. The landings set the stage for the next battle by placing a large force astride the NKPA line of operation to Pusan. The landings by themselves did not cause the defeat of the NKPA. When combined with the breakout by the Eighth (US) Army, the Inchon landings had the synergistic effect of causing the disintegration of the NKPA south of the 38th Parallel.[23]

In reviewing the concept for deep operations, the following observations appear concerning the dimensions of operations. The focus of activities in the deep arena is the attack of enemy forces that can influence friendly forces in the close arena. The duration of deep operations is finite because they commence and conclude before the decisive action in the close arena. The period of duration can

be short or long, governed only by the start-time relative to the start-time of close operations. The arrangements in space for deep operations are the "fringes" of the battle area. Deep operations occur when applying carefully calculated concentrations of mass at specific points to achieve a decisive result.

The last arena to be considered is rear operations. Rear operations at the operational level focus on the next phase of a campaign or major operation.[24] FM 100-5 declares that successful rear operations are critical to exploiting success or recovering from failure. Clearly, anticipation is a primary characterization of activities in the operational rear.

The design of activities for rear operations seeks to assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations.[25] Four particular rearward activities must take place: assembly and movement of reserves, redeployment of fire support systems, a continuous sustainment effort to include its protection and survivability, and the protection and maintenance of command and control systems.[26]

Typical Activities Comprising Rear Operations[27]

- Assembly and movement of reserves
- Redeployment of fire support systems
- Protection and maintenance of the sustainment system
- Maintenance of command and control systems
- Establishment & maintenance of LOC's
- Traffic regulation and control
- Medical and field services
- Refugee control and maintenance of civil order

Figure Three.

Activities within the Pusan Perimeter serve to illustrate AirLand Battle rear operations. The Eighth (US) Army not only had to establish a base of support, but also had to be prepared to evacuate if the perimeter failed. When the Inchon landings and Eighth (US) Army breakout commenced, the rear operations

had shifted to offensive operations. When the breakout did occur and moved rapidly into the pursuit phase, the rear operations included all of the activities listed in figure three. The important event was the rapid transition from defense to pursuit and exploitation.

The following evaluations of the dimensions for rear operations materialize. The focus of activities that provides unity of effort to rear operations is the next close operation. The next close operation can take any form i.e., a planned offensive or defensive battle, a pursuit and exploitation phase, or possibly a counterattack to recover from a failed operation. The period of duration for rear operations is constant. The duration lasts longer than close operations because it commences well before and concludes only with beginning of the next preparation phase for close battle. The requirements of the next close operation drive the rate at which time becomes compressed by the arrival of D-Day and H-Hour. Rear activities occupy all the mediums of space and can extend as far back as the theater depot or national source of origination. Rear activities by bulk alone require more space than either of the other arenas.

Having described what the three arenas for AirLand Battle operations are, consider how AirLand Battle doctrine synchronizes the arenas. Synchronization is what keeps the operational commander from dividing his forces "...simply because he vaguely felt that this was the way things ought to be."[28] The commander synchronizes to ensure that every resource is used when and where it will make the greatest contribution to success with nothing overlooked or wasted.[29]

The first step in synchronization of the three arenas occurs with the designation of the close battle. By fixing the time and place for close operations, the activities in the other two arenas automatically receive the time and place to focus their activities. The deep arena focuses only on those enemy forces which can have an effect at the place and time of the forces committed to the close

operation. The rear arena focuses its activities on completing preparations for the close operation and begins preparation for the next close battle. Essentially, the mission statement by itself provides for adequate synchronization of the activities in the three arenas.

The next step in synchronizing involves the allocation of resources to the activities in each of the arenas. Commanders apportion many resources, such as aviation, artillery, air forces, naval forces, and transportation, in time and space to more than one arena at a time. The commanders of activities in an arena and those responsible for resources allocated to more than one arena must consider the impact of each task assigned a resource. Analysis of each task must consider its potential to detract from applying maximum combat power in the close battle. For example, forward surveillance and target acquisition systems may functionally support deep operations, but should have instructions which allow them to identify targets which effect any close operations.

This ties directly into the next step in synchronization for the operational commander: the articulation of the commander's intent. The statement of the commander's intent provides the guidance necessary to keep operations synchronized when communications fail and personal communication is impossible. The commander's intent appears in three places of an order. The mission statement contains the commander's intent. While not specifically stated by the mission, achievement of the assigned mission must satisfy the commander's intent. The concept of the operations contains more explicit guidance. The concept of the operations must explain how to achieve the mission which must satisfy the commander's intent. A subordinate receives specific description in a section labeled Commander's Intent. Current U. S. Army doctrine now requires a statement of commander's intent between the mission statement and the concept of the operation.

What does the process of determining a center of gravity followed by the construction of three arenas for operations to attack the center of gravity reveal about the dimensions of operations for AirLand Battle? Three observations appear concerning the purpose over time in space.

First, the unity of effort for the activities of all three arenas is the application of the maximum combat power against a vulnerability in the enemy center of gravity in the close operation arena. The deep arena supports the close arena by denying enemy combat power external to the close battle area from influencing committed forces in the close battle area. This increases friendly combat power by subtracting enemy combat power. While deep operations may attack the enemy $C^2$ system, it is the activities in the close battle area which cause the $C^2$ system to collapse. Prior to the close battle, rear activities at the operational level have prepared the committed forces to apply the maximum combat power.

Second, time for AirLand Battle compresses into the period of application of maximum combat power in the close arena. Relatively long lead times for deep and rear operations are possible, but the commencement of close operations activities governs the time available to conduct AirLand battle operations. Maximum combat power for relatively short periods of duration occurs before a pause or lessening of combat power. Rear operations seek to provide as long a period of duration for combat power application as possible. On the other hand, deep operations seek to limit the duration by denying the enemy's capacity to add combat power.

Lastly, AirLand Battle doctrine arranges activities of the three arenas within interconnected layers. These layers reach from the fringe of the battle area in the deep arena. The layers converge at specific points to concentrate the maximum combat power in the close arena. Concurrently, the layers emanate

from rear area sustainment activities that stretch back to theater and CONUS sources. The occupation of space is smallest in the deep arena with the close arena substantially larger. The rear arena by the bulk and sources for its resources occupies a substantially larger space then both deep and close combined. The arrangement of the activities denies or ejects the enemy from friendly controlled space.

In concluding this examination of the dimensions of AirLand Battle doctrine, recall the opening statement by Carl von Clausewitz. The clear vision of the commander is what keeps the three arenas from dividing an army. It is that vision which synchronizes the three arenas to apply the maximum combat power of an army against a vulnerability in the center of gravity. In the next part of this study, synchronization for the minimum application of combat power will be examined in the challenge presented by counterinsurgency operations.

## PART TWO: COIN, A Multiagency Indirect Operation Short of War

> Any nation that uses it (people's war) intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use. Carl von Clausewitz[30]

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a type of multiagency indirect operation short of warfighting. During COIN operations armed conflicts can occur that look like warfighting. For operational commanders to achieve decisive results with counterinsurgency activities, there must be an understanding of the differences in the dimensions of warfighting and COIN operations.

This part of the study of the dimensions of operations will explore the multiagency indirect operation short of war called counterinsurgency. This exploration will dissect the doctrine for counterinsurgency in Field Manual 100-20 (Air Force Pamphlet 3-20), Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.

The evaluation of the doctrinal dimensions for counterinsurgency operations will produce a framework for discussing how the dimensions for counterinsurgency compare with the close, deep, and rear arenas of AirLand Battle doctrine.

A review of the fundamental precepts for military operations in low intensity conflict must occur before concentrating on the specifics of COIN. FM 100-20 states that there are five imperatives for low intensity conflict[31] (see figure 4).[32]




Figure Four.

Briefly they are defined as follows. Political dominance means that all operations, not just military ones, support political objectives. Further, political objectives and policies impose constraints and restraints on operations that may be non-doctrinal or unorthodox.

To furnish unity of effort military commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize their activities with other governmental activities. Usually, the military finds itself supporting these non-military agencies.

Adaptability describes the skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations. This is more than "tailoring" of forces to a situation. Forces may have to organize and operate differently from their intended Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E.)

Legitimacy conveys two concepts for LIC. One is its definition as the "willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions."[33] The second concept states that all operations

proceed according to law and must legally support the attainment of political objectives.[34]

The last imperative, perseverance, is critical to understanding the dimensions of operations in LIC. Low intensity conflicts are protracted struggles. The operational commander must be patient, resolute, and pursue persistently the national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them. Perseverance reflects the fact that low intensity conflicts rarely have a clear beginning or an end marked by decisive actions resulting from military victory.

With these imperatives as the foundation for all low intensity conflict, FM 100-20 then proceeds to prescribe actions for counterinsurgency. Appendix E, "A Guide to Counterinsurgency Operations," Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, describes the current U. S. Army doctrine for defeating an insurgent movement. Two fundamental premises underwrite the doctrine. The first premise requires a decision by the National Command Authority (NCA) to provide assistance to a government attempting to overcome an insurgent force.[35] The three following reasons support this decision:

1-The insurgency represents a threat to U. S. interests. When containment of the Soviet Union's promulgation of "world communism" was the primary interest for the United States, governments used "containment" to secure our aid. With the current retrenchment of the Soviet Union, a broader assessment of a threat to U. S. interests posed by an insurgency is now possible.

2-The supported government merits support. The requesting country's "human rights" record is a primary consideration here. A clear example is our support to El Salvador.

3-The feasibility of the intended action. Does the U.S. have the resources to make a difference? Does the affected country posses a workable plan to defeat the insurgency?

The second stated premise for U. S. involvement in COIN is that the burden of carrying on the conflict must remain with the *supported* government.[36] Our

past experience, particularly in Vietnam, clearly demonstrated the difficulties in defeating an insurgency when the U. S. *Americanized* the conflict.[37]

The doctrine establishes the following critical objective for the supported government to challenge and to defeat an insurgency. It must reorder the organization of its society so as to eliminate the causes of the conflict.[38] To accomplish this the government addresses two groups: the populace and the insurgents. The government provides measures to mobilize the populace and ward off, destroy, isolate, or convert the insurgents. Essentially, this is the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) concept.

The IDAD concept incorporates four mutually-supporting functions (see figure five) to compete with the insurgents for legitimacy by mobilizing support from the same pool of resources, the populace. A brief description of each function follows.




Figure Five.

Balanced development is the achievement of national goals through political, social, and economic programs; note the absence of military programs. These programs allow all individuals and groups in the society to *share* in the rewards of the development. This sharing of rewards satisfies legitimate grievances that the insurgents attempt to exploit. Recognizing and correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem of insurgency.[39] Institutional development must occur to create systems that enable a people to identify common national goals that form the basis of the political, social, and economic programs.[40] A government that is unwilling or

unable to conduct *viable* programs of balanced development must rely on brutal repression as the only option.[41]

Security is a two-fold activity that simultaneously protects the populace from the insurgency and provides a safe environment for programs of national development. Security implies a physical denial of access to popular support. Key to the security effort is establishing an environment in which the local populace provides for its own security with limited government support. The function of security generally begins with military operations but must transition to paramilitary or police operations as soon as possible.[42]

Neutralization is the physical and psychological separation of the insurgency from the population. Neutralization can take many forms. All the forms must be lawful activities designed to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat an insurgency without degrading the legitimacy of the government. Neutralization includes the following:

1-Public exposure and discrediting of insurgent leaders through the available information media. This involves relatively little political violence.

2-Arrests with subsequent prosecution when laws are broken. When perceived as a fair and just process, this creates immense legitimacy for the government with the populace.

3-Combat action when the insurgency escalates. These actions must be based on the maximum use of intelligence and the minimum use of violence.[43]

Mobilization provides organized manpower, material resources, and strengthening of existing and developed institutions. Mobilization builds upon the popular support for the government and promotes the government's legitimacy. Ideally, mobilization capitalizes on the balanced development programs. A key event is the participation by the populace in the electoral process with a subsequent, peaceful transition of power based on the elections. The net result of mobilization is disintegration of support for the insurgency.[44]

These four functions of IDAD describe the activities for consolidation operations in counterinsurgency. Consolidation operations restore government control of an area and its people. Consolidation is the paramount military operation in COIN[45]. A consolidation campaign consists of four overlapping stages (see figure six). These stages define the dimensions for operations in COIN.

| STAGES OF CONSOLIDATION[46] | |
|---|---|
| •Preparation | •Development |
| •Offensive | •Completion |

Figure Six.

During the preparation stage military forces plan, train, organize, and equip for operations under civilian control. Critical to preparation stage activities is the planning for bringing balanced development programs into the area quickly. These programs, based on the national goals, unite with the common goals of the liberated populace. To execute this, psychological operations resources and civil affairs units must accompany tactical combat units into the area. Additionally, PSYOP operations conducted ahead of offensive stage operations can reduce the time required to neutralize the insurgency in the area.[47]

There are many critical military activities that occur in the preparation stage. For instance, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) identifies and locates the insurgency's tactical forces, supporting bases, and political infrastructure. Also, coordination of air power provides transportation, resupply, and, where appropriate, tightly controlled close air support. Furthermore, training of the lowest echelons of all government personnel takes place in this stage with emphasis on the national goals and programs for the area brought back under governmental control. The military activities in this stage normally involve the bulk of U. S. security assistance programs.

The civilian leadership commands the operation and integrates civil and military organizations into a single task force to establish governmental control. Specific missions or areas may require formation of subordinate task forces. All task forces include civilian and military elements and are interagency, interdepartmental and joint.

The focus of activities in the preparation stage is the establishment of non-military, governmental control for an area. The period of duration for the activities in the preparation stage is inconsequential because advancement to the next stage requires completion of preparation activities first. National political, economic, and social programs must be in place and prepared for transplant to the liberated area. Training of the units to deploy and remain during follow-on stages must be complete. The best estimate of the duration for the preparation stage is "as long as necessary." The arrangement of activities in space for the preparation stage encompasses the three mediums of height, width, and length for the actual forces to be employed. However, the critical social, economic, and political programs occupy the realm of ideas, which does not translate in terms of space.

When deemed ready by the government, the offensive stage begins. The first goal in this stage is to clear the area of insurgent tactical units. The task forces move into the operational area quickly. Then, following the IPB from the preparation stage, the task forces locate and destroy or disperse insurgent tactical forces and support base system. The task forces also identify and apprehend members of the insurgency's political infrastructure. The selective and minimum use of combat power prevents unnecessary harm to the populace.[18]

Simultaneously, police and paramilitary personnel deploy and implement population and resource control measures (PRC) to deprive the insurgent of support. The PRC expedites the locating and identifying members of the

infrastructure. PSYOP helps inform the populace why the insurgents have made these measures necessary and when they will end. This introduces the function of neutralization through psychological separation of the insurgent from the populace.

Civil affairs and governmental agencies deploy with the task forces to set up or restore basic services to the area. They begin to lay the groundwork for implementing the social, political, and economic programs that are part of the balanced development. This serves as a visible sign that the government is there to help those who reject the insurgents.

The unity of effort in this stage is the establishment of government control. The period of duration can be short depending on the completeness of the IPB and the will of the insurgent to resist. The solution for evaluating the time period is that it will take as long as necessary to achieve governmental control. A relatively lengthy time prevails to complete the activities in the stage. Initially, the activities in this stage concentrate to facilitate entry into the area and then disperse throughout the area to deny or eject the insurgent.

When the emphasis for activity shifts from offensive actions to national development, the development stage begins. The civilian leadership establishes firm government control and puts developmental organizations into operation to implement social, political, and economic programs. The military eliminates remaining insurgent elements, prevents the return of insurgents, and insures internal security along with police and paramilitary organizations.[19]

The military and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture to protect areas secured in the offensive stage. Small military detachments live among the population to begin organizing and training local security forces. This also allows the political, social, economic, and psychological action cadres to conduct their activities in a secure environment. When the military conducts

civic action projects that are visible, simple, and easily accomplished with assistance from military resources, the populace sees evidence that the government is truly concerned about them.

Police forces maintain law and order. It is critical that all personnel in the area come under the legal jurisdiction of the same police forces. This increases the perception of legitimacy to the populace. The police forces also establish controls over the movement of personnel and supplies as part of PRC measures as long as insurgent activity continues in the area. They also guard critical food supplies and materiel during production and storage.

The reason for activities in this stage is to mobilize the populace. Mobilization provides organized manpower, material resources, and strengthening of existing and developed institutions. The period of duration for the development stage is not open-ended. The programs of balanced development take a relatively lengthy time to develop and mature. They generally cannot be hurried because they normally involve agriculture and construction projects. The activities in this stage array according to function with military activities occupying increasingly smaller portions in space to deny or eject insurgents. Because of this success, non-military functions are continuously occupying growing amounts of space.

The final stage is the completion stage. This stage begins with the acceleration and expansion of the balanced development programs. The government begins to return all responsibility for local government over to local authorities. Local authorities are able to provide their own internal security and defend with government support against insurgent attacks. Task forces begin releasing unneeded forces and action cadres back to national control. They must take care not to redeploy too soon. Establishment of a local reserve force and higher level reserves provides backup to local security forces. Mobilization of

the populace in support of the government is growing significantly. The government is well on its way to achieving national goals in this area.

The focus of activities in this stage is mobilization of popular support. The time period for the activities in this stage is indefinite. Eventually it becomes irrelevant when the insurgency ceases to exist or pose any threat to the government. The array of activities in this stage fixes the military in a very small portion of space while non-military activities permeate the area.

The functions and stages just described provide the operational commander with a process that causes effects on the populace and the insurgent. These effects concentrate on the primary goal of counterinsurgency: reordering the organization of a society so as to eliminate the causes of the conflict. The military commander must integrate and subordinate his operations to overlapping social, political, and economic programs of balanced development. On the basis of the results desired by balanced development, the operational commander visualizes how his military operations support these programs. The focal point for military activities in COIN is to support by providing the security to the populace and neutralizing the insurgent. The period of duration for military activities may take years. This places emphasis on synchronizing events over relatively long periods of duration. The arrangement of military activities in space concentrates on specific points that deny or eject insurgents from an area. Once the insurgents are ejected or denied from an area, military activities occupy increasingly smaller points in space until no longer required. In summary, the dimensions for military operations in COIN furnish activities that *support* a *lengthy* civilian campaign that does *not depend* on combat power to achieve final victory.

How do these dimensions for COIN compare with the current AirLand Battle dimensions of operations described by the arenas of close, deep, and rear at the

operational level? They are different as to what provides their unity of effort in space over time. Both COIN and AirLand Battle focus on achieving decisive results but in opposing forms. What provides unity of effort to AirLand Battle is the destruction or disintegration of an opposing force by the application of maximum combat power aimed through vulnerable points at a center of gravity. On the other hand, COIN destroys or disintegrates an opposing force when a government successfully mobilizes popular support with a minimum application of combat power.

This difference in purpose between COIN and AirLand Battle inverts the dimensions of time and space when comparing them for COIN and AirLand Battle. Time in AirLand Battle compresses to the moment of the close battle. Speed and rapid action typify time in AirLand Battle. Conversely, time in COIN is relatively long due to the length it takes to implement and develop mature social, political, and economic programs. Patience and endurance characterize COIN activities in time.

The comparative arrangement of military activities in space for COIN and AirLand Battle inverts in the dimension of time. Both AirLand Battle and COIN occupy space to deny and eject the opposing force. AirLand Battle activities occupy the total space of the battle area throughout the relatively short period of duration. COIN military activities occupy increasingly smaller points in space over a relatively long period of duration.

This part of the study compared military operations in a linear warfare environment with those in low intensity conflict environment. The next part of the study will examine the warfighting concept of AirLand Operations. This will set the stage for comparing linear and nonlinear warfighting doctrine.

## PART THREE: Warfighting in 1992

> Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.
> SUN TZU[50]

The revision of the U. S. Army's warfighting doctrine will appear in the 1992 edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Publication of the Field Manual will represent either an evolution or a revolution of the current (1986) AirLand Battle warfighting doctrine. It is certain that nonlinear warfare will receive much more attention in 1992 than the three paragraphs in the 1986 edition.

This part of the study of the dimensions of operations examines the emerging concept for AirLand Operations in nonlinear combat. The examination explores the concept for the dimensions of operational warfighting described in Department of the Army Pamphlet 525-5B, AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army.[51] The evaluation focuses on the framework of a nonlinear battlefield's operational cycle. This part concludes with a comparison of the framework with the dimensions defined by the close, deep, and rear arenas of AirLand Battle.

The nucleus of the AirLand Operations concept is an operational cycle consisting of zones and stages where nonlinear warfare occurs. Before describing the zones and stages, a discussion of the attributes of nonlinear warfare is necessary. The nature of nonlinear warfare is violent conflict between opposing forces, where at least one force operates with noncontiguous elements. The space between these noncontiguous elements is unsecured. The reasons for the existence of "noncontiguousness" cover a broad range. A commander may choose to organize noncontiguously for surprise and deception or to protect his force from weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, a lack of available means due to

restricted national resources or the size of a battle area (relative to the forces employed) may force the existence of noncontiguous areas.

Additionally, foreseeable technological advances in the fields of sensors, communications, ground and air mobility (both speed and bulk), and firepower will have a paradoxical effect on the battlefield. These improvements will generate a faster, more lethal, and discernible battlefield. This will cause commanders to consider ways to disperse to avoid presenting a massed target, yet still retain the ability to concentrate maximum combat power when detecting your opponent's concentration. This resembles the Soviet appreciation of the nuclear battlefield in the early 1960's.[52] At the same time, these improvements will also be extremely expensive in terms of expenditures of national wealth. An unlimited resourcing of the battlefield by nations risks prohibitive economic and social effects. The example of the Soviet retrenchment from East Europe supports this contention. This condition of prohibitively expensive technological advancements will tend to promote noncontiguousness, i.e., nonlinear warfare.

Given this propensity for nonlinear warfighting, AirLand Operations will not revise one concept from 1986 AirLand Battle, the center of gravity.[53] The center of gravity still forms the basis for the commander's vision of how to achieve decisive results in a campaign or major operation. This vision translates into objectives and the distribution of forces in the arenas of operations. These categories, zones and stages, describe the arenas for operations in AirLand Operations. Zones describe the arrangement of activities in space, while stages describe the arrangement of activities in time. Neither zones nor stages possess a fixed relationship. They exist as distinct, separate arenas for operations, but they more commonly overlap. Zones appear first in the mind of the operational commander. The commander will visualize zones (see figure seven) which doctrinally fall under the following headings: Detection Zone, Battle Zone,

Dispersal Area, and Logistics Area. The commander determines the size, shape, and activities of each zone to facilitate the synchronization required to achieve decisive results. Collectively these zones make up a shaping zone for the operational commander that defines where in the theater of operations or theater of war the commander will conduct operations.







Figure Seven.[54]

One of the first zones described by the commander as part of his "shaping" process is the detection zone. The detection zone embraces the spatial dimensions

of length, width, and height to include the mediums of air, land, sea, and the electromagnetic spectrum. What the commander can "sense," both visually and electronically, determines the size of the zone. The determination of size incorporates where the opposing forces can emanate from, where decisive operations could take place, and where the commander contemplates the location of the other zones.

Often, the logistics area evolves concurrently with the detection zone. In undeveloped theaters the logistics area begins with the initial points of entry for deploying forces. These points of entry provide the initial spatial dimensions for the zone. As the theater matures, the logistics area encompasses the supporting base areas. Logistics area activities occupy all the mediums of space and can extend as far back as the theater depot or national source of origination. When re-deployment activities commence, the logistics area concentrates around points of embarkation.

The dispersal area occurs throughout the operational cycle. The dispersal area requires sufficient space to allow for dispersal of forces prior to and after operations. It has the dual purpose of protecting the force by denying a mass for the enemy to target, while permitting rapid concentration to attack a massing enemy. The commander's vision of the shaping zone does not confine the dispersal zone to any area.

The battle zone exists where the commander chooses to conduct decisive operations. The amount of combat power applied in the zone defines its spatial requirements. All combat power concentrates in this zone and its spatial dimensions include the mediums of air, land, sea, and electromagnetism.

Concurrent with the formation of the shaping zone, the operational commander employs four conceptual stages to define activities in space (see figure seven). They are initially sequential and then overlap upon the initiation

of each. The activities in each stage are cyclic and focus the tactical activities of subordinates.

Stage I is the detection and preparation stage. The activities in this stage encompass deployment of the force, preparation of the battlefield, and protection of the force (see figure eight). Conduct of forced entry into the shaping zone occurs in this stage when required. These activities can occur simultaneously.

Typical Activities for Stage I Operations[55]

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)

DEEP SURVEILLANCE & TARGET ACQUISITION

ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR SUPERIORITY

DECEPTION AND COUNTERDECEPTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

PREPARING AND DEPLOYING FRIENDLY FORCES

LOGISTICAL STAGING

PROTECTION

OPSEC

Figure Eight.

Deployment of the force includes strategic movement, establishment of the support infrastructure, and positioning of forces in dispersal areas. The positioning of forces in dispersal areas is the primary method for protecting the force. A critical activity during establishment of the support infrastructure is the development of a communications-electronics network. This network provides the strategic and operational $C^2$ system, links the national and joint intelligence systems, and resources the sustainment data bases.

One of the major Stage I functions is preparation of the battlefield to obtain a clear picture of the enemy. The utility of this picture is two-fold. First, it works to provide protection of the force by structuring dispersal areas

and activities to deny the enemy capabilities to attack. Keeping in mind the nonlinear nature of his environment, the operational commander monitors the noncontiguous spaces to provide security for the space he does occupy. When the picture is clear enough for the commander to determine vulnerabilities in the enemy center of gravity, he decides on the place and time for the decisive battle. Then he states his intentions for structuring the shaping zone to fight the decisive battle. This initiates the activities of stages II and III.

The period of duration for this stage is relatively longer than the other stages principally because it comes first in the sequence of initiation. The activities in time for this stage never cease until completion of re-deployment. The detection of enemy forces from the earliest moment affords the greatest protection and requires continuous vigilance making the period of duration for this stage continuous throughout the operation cycle.

Stage II is the Establishing of the Conditions for Decisive Operations. In this stage the commander refines his concept for the shaping zone and brings the battle zone into focus. Employment of integrated fires, dynamic obstacles and air maneuver forces separates, isolates, and attrits designated forces. Relentlessly attacking those forces capable of influencing the decisive operation seizes the initiative. The forces required to apply maximum combat power in the decisive operation maneuver on the battle zone. The commander continually monitors the plan to determine when the conditions materialize to commence the decisive operations.

The period of duration in this stage begins relatively quickly after the initiation of Stage I. The period becomes increasingly compressed by satisfying each condition leading to commencement of the decisive operation. Political, climatic, strategic, operational, and tactical conditions generally tend to hasten the commencement of Stage III.




**Figure Nine.**

Stage III is the conduct of Decisive Operations. The commander applies maximum combat power to bring about destruction or disintegration of the enemy's center of gravity. Concurrently the commander visualizes the evolution of the shaping zone and energizes new Stage I and II activities. These subsequent operations capitalize on the achieved decisive results in this stage. In Stage II, commanders vigilantly look for opportunities anticipated as well as unplanned opportunities to exploit. The commander, having massed his combat power to achieve decisive results, must then act quickly to disperse forces to conduct Stage I and IV activities. This maintains a dynamic tempo for future operations and protects the force.

The period of duration for Stage III activities is short relative to Stages I and II. The design for activities in Stage III is the application of maximum combat

power to overwhelm the enemy and then disperse. The synergistic effect of the layered application of combat power brings about the destruction or disintegration of the enemy center of gravity in a relatively short period.

| Typical Activities for Stage III Operations[57] |
|---|
| ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS |
| COLLATERAL OPERATIONS TO PROVIDE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER |
| DECISIVE MANEUVER AND OVERWHELMING COMBAT POWER |
| CONTINUE STAGE I AND II ACTIVITIES FOR CURRENT OPERATION |
| BEGIN STAGE I AND II ACTIVITIES FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS |
| COMMAND AND CONTROL |
| SUSTAINMENT |
| PROTECTION |
| OPSEC |

Figure Ten.

The dispersal of forces from Stage III initiates Stage IV, Force Reconstitution. By careful planning and preparation in Stages I and II, only a portion of the operational force will need to conduct reconstitution operations.[58] Those elements not requiring reconstitution will move into Stage I and II operations for the next operations cycle. AirLand Operations envisions limited sustainment and possibly reorganization for reconstitution activities.[59] Regeneration occurs when catastrophic losses happen to a unit. Stage IV activities take place in the dispersal areas. Reconstitution task forces deploy from the logistics areas to link-up with or rendezvous with tactical units. The logistics planning and preparation, combined with rapid execution of logistics activities in the dispersal areas, multiplies the effect of any decisive operation. These activities contribute synergistically by producing a rapid tempo of consecutive operations cycles that assist the operational commander's retention of initiative.

The period of duration for Stage IV is the relatively shortest stage. By "unweighting"[60] the maneuver element from combat service support activities,

the duration of reconstitution operations reduces essentially to the time it takes to transfer supplies using Unit Distribution to the dispersal area.

| Typical Activities for Stage IV Operations[61] |
| --- |
| DISPERSAL OF THE FORCE |
| FORCE PROTECTION |
| SUSTAINMENT |
| REORGANIZATION |
| REGENERATION (IF REQUIRED) |
| OPSEC |
| STAGE I AND II ACTIVITIES FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS |

Figure Eleven.

The just described stages and zones comprise the operations cycle for AirLand Operations. The dimensions for operations, time and space, align fairly neatly with the depiction of stages and zones. Evaluating the dimensions of the operations cycle produces the following observations for the concepts of stages and zones.

The unity of effort for activities in space over time is the focus on producing decisive operations that set conditions inexorably leading to decisive operation (i.e., attack of the enemy's center of gravity). The detection and preparation stage begin with the formulation of the shaping zone in the mind of the operational commander. The operations cycle activities first center on determining *where* in space and time the decisive operations will take place. With that decision, the battle zone forms in the commander's conceptual shaping zone. The logistics area initially focuses on activating the support capabilities required to establish the conditions for the decisive operations. With the origination of the battle zone's place in the shaping zone, the conditions for the decisive operation become the purpose. Deep, tactical combat along with the planning for the subsequent actions of dispersal and force reconstitution

comprises Stage II activities. The decisive operation is stage III. Stage IV and a rapid transition into the next operation cycle with new decisive operations complete the original operations Cycle.

Political, geographic, strategic, operational, and tactical conditions govern the period of duration for operations cycles. No matter how long the available period of duration is the entire period compresses upon the decisive operations in the battle zone. The activities of the shaping zone, Stage I and Stage II focus on setting conditions that generate combat power rapidly and react to "windows of opportunity" presented by the enemy.[62] The focus for activities in the dispersal and logistics areas of Stage IV is rapid reconstitution of combat power to begin a new Operations Cycle. The fixing of the time for decisive operations works to compress the time for all prior and subsequent activities.

"Nested zones" best describes the arrangement of activities in space for the Operations Cycle. The "all-enveloping" zone is the shaping zone. It comprises all the physical and electromagnetic mediums of space within the influence and control of the operational commander. The battle zone defines the space within the shaping zone for maximum combat power application. The opposing force is both isolated within and separated from this battle zone by forces attacking from dispersal zones. A logistics area sustains from fixed bases to dispersal areas the combat power within the shaping zone. The battle zone, dispersal, and logistics areas can overlap within the shaping zone. The arrangement of the shaping zone includes unsecured, but monitored areas. All of the activities in the shaping zone focus on concentrating maximum combat power in the battle zone.

How does this compare with the close, deep, and rear arenas described in the current AirLand Battle doctrine? Both doctrines envision a specific time and place for decisive operations. The decisive operations in both concepts are for the purpose of applying maximum combat power against vulnerabilities in the

enemy's center of gravity. This leads to disintegration or destruction of the center of gravity producing a military condition that accomplishes a strategic aim. Current doctrine calls this the "close battle." The concept of AirLand Operations calls it the "battle zone." Essentially, they are the same activity with different names.

The dimension of time for AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations does not appear to be different. Both concepts compress time around the moment of the decisive operation. Time "compresses" when the flexibility and margin for error in an action rapidly decrease. An example of this appears historically in Operation OVERLORD. Time became compressed from the moment General Eisenhower made the decision to launch the assault.[63]

The difference between AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations appears in the dimension of space. AirLand Battle portrays a layered battlefield with close operations essentially occurring between the deep and rear arenas. The stated arrangement of deep operations is "...forward of the line of contact" with rear operations "...comprising activities rearward of elements in contact."[64] On the other hand, the nested areas within a shaping zone for AirLand Operations allow activities to co-locate or exist without regard to enemy locations. The arrangement of activities orients on optimum positions throughout the shaping zone to apply maximum combat power into a battle zone.

## CONCLUSIONS

> It will be better to offer certain considerations for reflection, rather than to make sweeping dogmatic assertions. Alfred Thayer Mahan[65]

In this study, what has the comparison of the arenas for AirLand Battle operations with COIN and the AirLand Operations Cycle demonstrated? Clearly,

mastery of the military operation's time-space relationship starts in the mind of the commander. From this start point, whether the operation is linear, nonlinear, or a multiagency indirect operation, the commander synchronizes a campaign or major operation with a four part process (see figure twelve.) The key part of the process is the designation in time and space of the decisive operation. The other three parts focus on bringing about the decisive operation in time and space.

THE FOUR PART SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS

- The designation in time and space of the decisive operation
- The arrangement of activities in time and space to prepare for decisive operations
- The arrangement of activities in time and space to isolate and separate the enemy
- The arrangement of activities in time and space to sustain the decisive operation

Figure Twelve.

In all three doctrines, the first part of the commander's synchronization process begins with the determination of the "effects" desired. For linear and nonlinear warfighting, the effects are related to the enemy center of gravity. Specifically, the commander decides upon destroying or disintegrating the center of gravity. Then vulnerabilities in the center of gravity are identified for decisive operations to concentrate maximum combat power. The decisive operations for linear and nonlinear operations occur respectively in the *CLOSE BATTLE* and the *DECISIVE OPERATION in the BATTLE ZONE.*

Inversely, the COIN commander in decisive operations seeks to employ the minimum required combat power. The decisive operations in COIN are not military. The decisive operations are overlapping political, social, and economic programs of balanced development. Decisive military operations in COIN *support* the establishment and maintenance of government control in an area for the purpose of mobilizing manpower for the government's IDAD program. Decisive military operations in COIN occur in the *CONSOLIDATION STAGE.*

In a like manner, linear, nonlinear, or COIN decisive military operations are given a fixed place in time and space by the commander. With the designation of the decisive operation, the other parts of the process fall neatly into place for linear, nonlinear, or COIN operations. For linear and nonlinear warfighting, the dimension of time compresses the arrangement of activities. Preparation, which includes deployment into the area of operations and detection of the enemy, isolation and separation of the enemy forces in the decisive area, and sustainment compress upon the period of duration designated for the decisive operation. This compression of time lessens flexibility and the margin for error as the decisive operation period draws closer to the moment of execution.

Linear and nonlinear warfighting differ in the dimension of space. Linear warfighting layers the battlefield to arrange activities. Nonlinear warfighting frames the battlefield with nested zones that have noncontiguous areas between them. This effects how each doctrine goes about preparing, isolating and separating the enemy forces, and sustaining friendly forces. Preparing and sustaining forces requires different approaches to security or protection of the force. Linear warfare addresses security and protection by denying enemy access through lines and reacting to any incursions that are made. Nonlinear warfare denies the enemy opportunity to disrupt through dispersal and the pre-emptive attack of any massing forces. Isolating and separating the enemy forces differ essentially because linear warfare separates and isolates layers by cutting them off from adjacent forces. Nonlinear warfare deals with pockets by destroying them or forcing them to disperse.

In contrast, COIN operations invert the dimensions of operations from warfighting doctrine. Time is <u>not</u> compressed at the operational level in COIN. In fact, the period of duration will generally be lengthy to ensure the neutralization of the insurgent and the security of the populace. When employing minimum

combat power at selective points in time and space the activities of preparation, isolation and separation of the insurgent, and sustainment endure a relatively longer time.

COIN operations also differ from warfighting in space. COIN military operations, while concentrated initially, naturally seek to disperse. This dispersion reflects a desire both to keep the insurgent increasingly fragmented and present as unobtrusive presence to the populace as possible. In effect, a measure for success of military operations in COIN could be how little space they occupy.

In conclusion, this study has shown that the relationship between the AirLand Battle arenas for operations, COIN, and the AirLand Operations Cycle is a four-part synchronization process. The process arranges activities in space over time. This process starts in the commander's mind and serves him to create an effect that will produce a military condition. This military condition is either the objective of a warfighting campaign or contributes to an IDAD program. The key to remember is that the process creates an effect in space over time.

1. Hawking, Stephen W., A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes. Bantam Books, New York 1988. Page 24.

2. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Pages 15 & 18

3. Ibid. Page 19.

4. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5B,"AIRLAND OPERATIONS: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 26 March 1991. Pages 9-11

5. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 2

6. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1984. Page 204

7. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 17.

8. Ibid. Page 10 and Appendix B.

9. There are other critical tasks to be accomplished by the operational commander nearly simultaneously concerning generation of combat power, preparing for war or major operations, determining the strategic objectives and required military end states but these are topics outside the scope of this study.

10. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 179

11. Ibid. Page 179

12. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1984. Page 595

13. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 179

14. This assertion stems from the examples of the Union Campaigns of US Grant after the Wilderness Campaign, the Western Front in WWI, and the effects of WWII on the British nation. The theoretical support for this derives from Jean de Bloch's Future of War in its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations. (The World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1914) which proved to be less than completely accurate in its assessment that WWI was impossible to wage without risking national suicide. It was waged nevertheless and it can be argued that the heads of state of Russia, Germany, and Austria in effect committed political suicide considering the demise of each regime as a result of WWI.

15. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 30

16. LTC Viale's discussion of the center of gravity (Viale, Charles R. LTC. "A Conversation at the Club." Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 March 1988.) articulates the interpretative problems surrounding the FM 100-5 explanation of center of gravity. This study

accepts that the center of gravity must be identified more specifically than the enemy force to be of utility. Further it must be something that combat power can effect.

17. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 180

18. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 19

19. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 19

20. Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953. Anchor Books, New York. 1987. Page 221.

21. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 19

22. FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 20

23. Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953. Anchor Books, New York. 1987. Page 318

24 FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 20

25 FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 20

26 FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 20

27 FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 21

28. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1984. Page 204

29 FM 100-5, "Operations". HQDA, May 1986. Page 18

30 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 1984. Page 479.

31. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Glossary-14 provides the definition of LIC used in this study.

32. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Also, the 1992 version of FM 100-5 currently has adopted Political dominance and Legitimacy as precepts that govern the conduct of all U. S. military operations.

33. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Pages 1-9

34. This definition is an adaptation of the definition in FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict" (HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December

1989) as it now appears in (DRAFT)Chapter 3, 1992 FM 100-5, "Operations". School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 April 1991.

35 FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page 2-25

36 FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page 2-25

37. Burgess, William H. III, CPT USA and LTC Peter F. Bahnsen, retired. "Twelve Rules for Obtaining U. S. Support," Military Review, January 1990. Pages 61-70

38. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page E-1

39. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page 2-15

40. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page E-2

41. Burgess, William H. III, CPT USA and LTC Peter F. Bahnsen, retired. "Twelve Rules for Obtaining U. S. Support," Military Review, January 1990. Pages 61-70 "Rule # 8."

42. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page 2-16

43. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Pages 2-16&17

44. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page 2-16

45. Strike Operations are also part of COIN. Strike operations are special major combat operations that take place primarily during the preparation stage of consolidation operations. The purpose of STRIKOPs is to provide security to the area targeted for consolidation by disrupting and disorganizing the insurgents and reduce his morale. STRIKOPs take place in remote, contested or insurgent controlled areas. STRIKOPs are not designed to regain control of the area, but follow the same principles as for consolidation operations to set the conditions for future operations in the area of the strike. To stay within the limits of this study, STRIKOP's are not discussed to avoid duplicating descriptions of the dimensions for operations in COIN. See FM 100-20, pp E-12 thru E-19.

46. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page E-7

47. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page E-8

48. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Pages 8&9

49. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict". HQDA/HQDAF, 1 December 1989. Page E-10

50. Bellamy, Chris. The Future of LAND WARFARE. St. Martin's Press, New York. 1987. Page 277

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52. Grau, Lester W., LTC USA. "Soviet Nonlinear Combat in Future Conflict." Military Review, December 1990. Page 16.

53. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5B, "AIRLAND OPERATIONS: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 26 March 1991. Page 12.

54. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5B, "AIRLAND OPERATIONS: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 26 March 1991. Page 14.

55. (DRAFT)Chapter 3, 1992 FM 100-5, "Operations." School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 April 1991. Page 42.

56. (DRAFT)Chapter 3, 1992 FM 100-5, "Operations." School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 April 1991. Pages 43-44.

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58. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5B, "AIRLAND OPERATIONS: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 26 March 1991. Page 22.

59. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5B, "AIRLAND OPERATIONS: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 26 March 1991. Page 22.

60. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5B, "AIRLAND OPERATIONS: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army," TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA, 26 March 1991. Page 22.

61. (DRAFT)Chapter 3, 1992 FM 100-5, "Operations." School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 April 1991. Page 47.

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